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ARBITRATION OF THE UNITED STATES-FRANCE
AIR TRAFFIC RIGHTS DISPUTE
BY PAUL B. LARSENt
I. INTRODUCTION
F EBRUARY 22, 1964, the day the arbitration tribunal announced its
decision in the United States-France air traffic rights dispute' may be
considered a landmark date in international arbitration. It was the first
time in the history of bilateral air transport agreements' that rights granted
under an agreement became the object of arbitration.
The United States-France case is characterized by general agreement
between the parties on arbitral procedure, accomplished by a tight pre-
arbitration agreement, and willingness of the parties to arbitrate. While
compulsion to settle disputes exists in most bilateral air transport agree-
ments, including the United States-France Air Transport Services Agree-
ment of 1946,' attempting the method is a different matter. Although
many air transport disputes are suitable for arbitration, not until the
United States-France case did two parties prove that it can be an effective
means of settlement. Thorough study of the issues by a competent tribunal
contributed toward making this a model for later arbitrations. The issues
expose practices which, in the light of the award, will be worth study by
governments and carriers.
A curious feature is that the contracting governments pleaded the case,
although the airlines whose traffic rights are concerned were the real parties
t LL.M. in International Law, New York University; Member of the Institute of Air and Space
Law.
' Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, Established pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement
Signed at Paris, on January 22, 1963, Between the United States of America and France, Decided
at Geneva on December 22, 1963. Int'l Legal Materials, July, 1964, p. 668.
2 Approximately 600 bilateral agreements are registered with ICAO.
'Department of State Bulletin, 506, March 30, 1964. For a general bibliography on arbitration,
consult B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals,
Part IV: General Principles of Law in Judicial Proceedings (1953); Cheng, International Law in
the United Nations, 8 Year Book of World Affairs 170-195 (1954); Cheng, Law of International
Air Transport 454-464 (1962); J. C. Cooper, New Problems in International Civil Aviation
Arbitral Procedure, 2 Arbitration Journal 119-124 (1947); M. Domke, International Civil Avia-
tion Sets New Pattern, I International Arbitration Journal 20-29 (1945); R. 0. Hingorani,
Dispute Settlement in International Civil Aviation, 14 Arbitration Journal 14-25 (1959); D.H.N.
Johnson, The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, 30 British Yearbook of International Law
152-177 (1953); P. B. Larsen, Arbitration in Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, Bind 2, Arkiv
for Luftrett 145-164 (1964); R. H. Mankiewicz, Pouvoir Judiciare du Conseil et Riglement
Pour la Solution de Diffrends, 3 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 384-394 (1957);
L. Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, Le Riglement des Diffdrends Internationaux Relatifs d la Navigation
Airienne Civile, 2 Revue Francaise de Droit Atrien 340-396 (1948); J. L. Simpson and H. Fox,
International Arbitrations (1959); E. Wessberge, L'arbitrage et les accords internationaux de trans-
port adrien, 14 Revue Glnirale de l'Air 3-15 (1951).
" United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, Mar. 27, 1946, 61 Stat. 3445, T.I.A.S.
No. 1679.
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in interest. The pressure of the interested United States carrier on its gov-
ernment is evident throughout the arbitration.5
The United States requested the arbitration, thus indicating a significant
change in United States policy on the method of settling bilateral air
transport disputes: prior to 1962, the government had relied on negotia-
tions.
Although the tribunal decided in favor of France on the legal interpre-
tation of the United States-France bilateral air transport agreement, its
final decision favors the United States on a question which is both legal
and equitable, i.e. would it be fair to deprive Pan American Airways
(PAA) of traffic rights which it had obtained legally by French permis-
sion, and which France had permitted the airline to enjoy for a considerable
period of time? In permitting the tribunal to determine the basis for the
award,' the parties made room for equitable considerations.
II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ARBITRATION
J. Parker Van Zandt was a member of a school of political geographers'
which much influenced world air transport thinking at the time of the
Chicago Convention' and thus also in 1946, when the United States-France
Air Transport Services Agreement was being negotiated. Van Zandt found
that the world could naturally be divided up into eight major trade regions'
and air transport should be conceived in terms of commercial intercourse
among them. His proposed region of "Greater Europe" consisted of the
British Isles, Continental Europe, Mediterranean Africa and Mediterranean
Asia. A map of the Western Hemisphere from his book The Geography
of World Air Transport, includes Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
Turkey and the Northern parts of Iraq and Iran, as part of Mediterranean
Asia. 0
To indicate the influence of the regional concept, it is important to
note that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has set
up a decentralization scheme which roughly corresponds to Van Zandt's
eight major areas." Each ICAO region holds separate meetings and main-
' Air France, being a nationalized industry, has identity of interest with the French government.
See J. Gourrier, Le Nouveau Statut d'Air, Revue G~nrale d'Air 356-361 (1953).
' For a discussion of law which arbitration tribunals shall apply see Simpson and Fox, op. cit.
supra note 3, at Chapter 7.
' J. Parker Van Zandt, The Geography of World Air Transport. 10 (1944). See Documentation
Francaise: Les GRANDES REGIONS ECONOMIQUES DANS LA GEOGRAPHIE MONDIALE
DU TRANSPORT AERIEN, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 124 of August 27, 1945. Also
see Paul-Emile Victor, Bases d'une G~opolitique de l'Air, 10 Revue Gin~rale d'Air 249-250 (1947);
Elsworth Huntington, Geography and Aviation, 2 Air Affairs 49, 53 (1947). The contemporary
influence of Van Zandt's philosophy is noted by E. Pipin, G~ographie de la Circulation Afrien 62
(1956) and the philosophy is adopted by M. Dacharry, Geographic du Transport Arien, Air France
Relations Exterieures (1959). Javier Rubio Garcia-Mina, La Geographia ECONOMICA EN LA
DETERMINACION DE LAS RUTAS DE TRANSPORTE AEREO, Revista de Ingenieria Aero-
niutica n.29 2-8 (1956-57) attacks Van Zandt's theories on the ground that the proposed regions
are arbitrary and do not give due importance to certain commercially important areas such as
Australia.
'The Chicago Convention, 60 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1944).
' Van Zandt's eight regions were Greater Europe, North America, Union of Socialist Soviet Re-
publics, Africa, Middle America, South America, Asia and Oceania, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 9-10.
'ld. at 10.
" ICAO originally had ten regions, but early changed to eight regions. The present ICAO re-
gions are the North Atlantic, the European-Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the
Pacific, the South American/South Atlantic, the South East Asia, and the African-Indian Ocean
regions. See ICAO A10-WP/17, TE 3 (20/3/56), p. 1. Also see Memorandum on ICAO 24-25,
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tains separate offices. The International Air Transport Association (IATA)
has divided the world into three regions, the so-called Traffic Conferences,
which meet separately each year.' The second IATA Conference consists
of Europe, Africa and the Middle East, including Iran. 3
It can reasonably be concluded that contemporary regional concepts in-
fluenced the negotiators of the United States-France Agreement of 1946.
One can note here the same tendency to describe air routes generally so
that specific points within the region could be changed in accordance with
shifting economic needs for air service. Under this theory a region might
be well served by one airline. It failed to provide for a situation in which
competing airlines would attempt to take advantage of the imprecise word-
ing in the route description. In 1946, neither party could foresee the im-
portance of a point-by-point description of air routes in the Near East.
Global air transport was in its infancy. The future commercial value of
traffic rights in the Near East was not appreciated. Neither party envisaged
in 1946 that French aviation would at a later date wish to restrict United
States competition in the area.
In the 1946 bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement, France granted
the United States two routes through the Near East. Route One4 goes from
the United States to Paris and beyond via Switzerland, Italy, Greece,
Egypt, the Near East, India, Burma, Thailand, Hanoi to China and beyond.
Route Two" goes from the United States over Spain to Marseille and then
via Milan and Budapest to Turkey and beyond, meeting another United
States air route in India. Trans World Airlines (TWA) began services on
Route One, from which it has not deviated, and on which it still operates.
Route Two is only indirectly relevant to the dispute, for the essence of
the "Near East" problem is the commercial traffic rights in Paris.
In 1950, the Civil Aeronautics Board decided to permit PAA to com-
pete with TWA on Route One."8 Both airlines were thus able to offer
service to Paris and beyond. PAA, however, informed the French authori-
ties that it was going to offer air service on a route from the United States,
via Paris and Rome to Beirut in Lebanon. Beirut was not specifically
mentioned in Route One of the 1946 Agreement between the United
States and France, and the French government doubted PAA's right to
serve it. France questioned the inclusion of Beirut within the definition
of "Near East." Old political and cultural French interests in Syria and
Lebanon were also stressed as giving France a particular interest in the
air service between France and Beirut. In spite of these reservations, PAA
was given permission to serve Beirut, subject to the usual regulation of
capacity, included in the 1946 Agreement. The French objection to
PAA's Beirut service, as well as its eventual consent, were to become deci-
sive elements to the Arbitration Tribunal's opinion.
54 (1960); M. Sheffy, The Air Navigation Commission of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 312 (1957).
"There are three oficial regional IATA Conferences, but since these Conferences meet with
each other to iron out common problems, there actually are six regional IATA Conferences. Sir
William Hildred, Lecture to the Institute of Air and Space Law, January 17, 1964.
" Facts About IATA No. PRO - 15,000 - 7/5 5.
14 U.S.-France Agreement, op. cit. supra note 4, at Annex, Schedule II.
1" Ibid.
"North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, CAB Docket No. 3589; 1950 U.S. Av. 335.
17Minutes of the discussion between the two parties, March 19, 1951, quoted in the Decision,
op. cit. supra note 1.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Tehran, Iran, was not served by PAA until 1955, when the airline
notified the French government that in the future its route over Paris and
Rome to Beirut would be extended to Tehran. France objected again, on
the ground that Tehran was not in the Near East within the meaning of
Route One of the 1946 Agreement, but that this city was located in the
Middle East, which the Agreement did not permit the United States to
serve via Paris. Neither, France argued, was Tehran on a reasonably direct
route to India. The United States disagreed. It argued that the terms "Near
East" and "Middle East" are commonly used synonymously and that
Tehran indeed was on a reasonably direct route to India.
The outcome was that PAA was permitted to fly to Tehran under the
same conditions it flew to Beirut."8 The French government called it a
"temporary" permit, but the arrangement was not disturbed by France
until just before the time of the arbitration. Consent to PAA service to
Tehran weakened the French position, as will be shown later.
When PAA in 1955 planned a service to Istanbul via Paris and Rome,
the airline was told by France that it could not embark traffic in Paris for
disembarkment in Istanbul, nor vice versa, because Istanbul was not ex-
plicitly part of Route One, and was not included in the Paris "beyond"
rights to the "Near East." The United States Ambassador in Paris inter-
vened. He maintained that the term "Near East" usually is thought to
include Turkey and that, therefore, PAA could serve Turkey on Route
One. France, however, in line with its previous objections to United States
service in this region, explained that in its opinion Turkey was not within
"Near East," on Route One. Turkey was expressly mentioned in Route
Two, thereby excluding it from Route One; neither would France permit
the United States unilaterally to extend Route One to a new country,
Turkey, on the basis of Section VII of the Annex to the 1946 Agreement'
because that section was not intended for such major changes in a route.
French opposition to United States interpretation of "Near East," at this
point, later became crucial to the Tribunal's review of the problem.
France's refusal to allow changes under Section VII was also to influence
the Tribunal's understanding of the wording of that section.
As a result of French unwillingness to bend, the United States Ambassa-
dor advised PAA not to operate commercial traffic between Paris and
Istanbul. PAA was, however, permitted to operate without embarkation
rights on the flight to and from Paris. Under the same conditions, the
Istanbul service was later extended to Ankara in Turkey.0
The 1957-59 crisis in the United States-France air traffic rights relation-
ship ended with only a partial solution of the problem regarding air service
"ABC World Airways Guide 350 (May, 1955).
"9 Section VII: Changes made by either Contracting Party in the routes described in the Sched-
ules attached except those which change the points served by these airlines in the territory of the
other Contracting Party shall not be considered as modifications of the Annex. The aeronautical
authorities of either Contracting Party, may therefore proceed unilaterally to make such changes,
provided, however, that notice of any change is given without delay to the aeronautical authorities
of the other Contracting Party.
If such other aeronautical authorities find that having regard to the principles set forth in
Section IV of the present Annex, interests of their air carrier or carriers are prejudiced by the
carriage by the air carrier or carriers of the first Contracting Party of the traffic between the
territory of a third country, the authorities of the two Contracting Parties shall consult with a
view to arriving at a satisfactory agreement.
"°Airways Guide, op. cit. supra note 18, at 346 (March, 1956).
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to Turkey via Paris. The parties vaguely agreed that unilateral changes
made under Section VII must lie within the general path of a route. 1 A
rider was attached to a 1960 agreement 2 which extended French service
to California. The rider provided that the "existing service" by PAA
between Paris and Istanbul would not be disturbed by France. This guar-
anteed PAA's practice of flying between Istanbul and Paris, without com-
mercial traffic rights, and it later became of great legal consequence for
the establishment of the route to Turkey.
Soon afterwards, the Istanbul-Ankara schedule was extended to Bagdad,
without French opposition."
According to the World Airways Guide,24 PAA served Tehran via Istan-
bul since 1956. In 1961, however, PAA officially notified the French gov-
ernment that the airline would substitute Tehran for Bagdad on some of
the Paris-Istanbul-Bagdad flights. France bluntly reiterated that PAA had
no right to fly beyond Istanbul and that it should confine its activities to
that city. Temporary permission for commercial traffic rights between
Paris and Tehran via Istanbul expired. From October 31, 1962, PAA did
not embark passengers in Paris for Tehran, and vice versa.
The negotiations had reached a deadlock, but by October 12, 1962, the
United States Ambassador in Paris had already notified the French gov-
ernment that the United States desired arbitration.2 Article X of the 1946
Agreement, as amended in 1951,26 provides for compulsory arbitration at
the demand of either party.
Article I of the separate Arbitration Agreement of 19632 describes the
two issues to be arbitrated: (1) Under the United States-France Air Trans-
port Services Agreement, does a United States air carrier have the right to
provide service between the United States and Turkey via Paris, and may
it embark passengers in Paris for Turkey, or vice versa? (2) Under the
United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, does a United
States air carrier have the right to provide service between the United
States and Iran via Paris, and may it embark passengers in Paris for Iran,
and vice versa?
III. CONDUCTING THE ARBITRATION
A. The Agreed Basis For The Arbitration
The United States and France agreed in Article X of the 1946 Agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes. Arbitration clauses are usually included
in bilateral air transport agreements s although they never seem to be used.
2' Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 44.
22 Exchange of Notes, April 5, 1960, T.I.A.S. 5135.
" Airways Guide, op. cit. supra note 18, at 396 (July, 1958).
"Id. at Sept. 1956.
"Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra 1, at 47-52.
2s U.S.-France Air Transport Services Agreement, op. cit. supra note 4, as amended 139 U.N.T.S.
151 (1951).27The Arbitration Agreement of 1963 with France, Jan. 22, 1963, [1963, Part 1] 14 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 120, T.I.A.S. No. 5280; 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 1029-1032 (1963).
28 It is interesting to note that the Soviet bloc practice is to omit arbitration clauses in their
bilateral air transport agreements. See: U.S.S.R.-Pakistan, 7 Oct. 1963, ICAO Reg. No. 1729;
U.S.S.R.-India, ICAO Reg. No. 1380, 393 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended 13 Nov. 1962, ICAO Reg.
1656; U.S.S.R.-Ghana, 6 April 1962, 1CAO Reg. No. 1731. Also see Larsen, op. cit. supra note
3, at 148; compare Dmitri Ramzaitsev, The Law of International Trade in the New Soviet Legis-
lation, Journal of Business Law 6 (July, 1963) which indicates extensive Soviet arbitration prac-
tice in commercial dealings.
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In addition to this provision, the United States and France drafted a sepa-
rate, more detailed document in 1963 outlining the way the specific "Near
East" issues would be arbitrated." Although the parties were compelled to
arbitrate disputes under Article X of the 1946 Agreement, they apparently
felt that the 1963 compromise would provide a more orderly basis for the
arbitration. Since the Arbitration Agreement of 1963 does not abrogate
Article X of the 1946 Agreement, they are both applicable, and must be
read together.
By oral stipulations before the Tribunal, the parties also agreed that the
Tribunal should apply a broad interpretation of the Arbitration Agree-
ment. This meant that the scope of the arbitration was not limited to the
words describing Route One, but included all the formal and informal
understandings into which the parties later had entered. Under such a
liberal interpretation of the scope of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal could
weigh the practices of the parties.
Implicit in agreements for arbitration is that the parties accept the cus-
tomary international law which has accrued regarding arbitration as a
method of peacefully settling international disputes."
B. Binding Effect Of The "Advisory Opinion"
The Arbitration Tribunal, by Article X of the 1946 Agreement, is
merely called upon to give an advisory opinion to the parties.31 However,
the parties, by an exchange of letters,"2 explicitly bound themselves to
accept the Tribunal's decisions. Therefore, the parties received an ordinary
arbitration award, not an advisory opinion as described in Article X. Ac-
tually any distinction between the two terms is unnecessary.
C. The Arbitration Tribunal
Choosing arbitrators is crucial, for if one party does not desire an award,
it can cause the arbitration to collapse at this point.
Bilateral air transport agreements in the period immediately after the
Chicago Convention provided for arbitration by the PICAO (subsequent-
ly ICAO) Council." Later agreements avoided the use of the ICAO
Council in arbitration, because this large body is not suited for such a
role.' The amendment version of Article X in the 1946 Agreement has not
quite eliminated the use of the ICAO Council. This article provides for
an independent, non-institutional arbitration tribunal, consisting of three
arbitrators. Such a tripartite arbitration tribunal has frequently replaced
the ICAO Council."
29 Arbitration Agreement of 1963, op. cit. supra note 27.
30 Simpson and Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131.
a The Advisory Opinion constitutes an arbitration, according to Cheng, The Law of Interna-
tional Air Transport, op. cit. supra note 3, at 458. The parties in Art. X promise to use their
"best efforts" to put the opinion into effect. In the U.S.-France arbitration, the parties have the
legal powers to put the opinion into effect, and this writer believes that under these circumstances,
the parties are bound by international law to put the opinion into effect.
3a U.S.-France Exchange of Letters, Dec. 8, 1962-Jan. 9, 1963 as quoted in the Decision of the
Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2.
aa Article X of the U.S.-France Agreement of 1946, before it was amended, op. cit. supra
note 26, is a case in point.
" Goedhuis, Questions of Public International Air Law, 81 Recueil La Haye 205 at 267 (1952).
Also see Cheng, op. cit. supra note 31, at 460; and Hingorani, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15; and
Larsen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 152, 158-160.
"2 U.S.-Denmark, Aug. 6, 1954, [1954, Part 2] 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1423; U.S.-Germany, Apr.
16, 1956, [1956, Part 1] 7 U.S.T. F4 O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536; U.S.-India, Feb. 3, 1956,
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The Arbitration Tribunal must be named with descriptive certainty.
Otherwise arbitration may not be enforceable." The United States-France
Agreement of 1946 sufficiently describes the nominating process. Article
X, as amended, provides that each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The
two party-selected arbitrators shall in turn appoint the third member of
the tribunal. If they cannot agree on the third arbitrator, the President of
the International Court of Justice shall appoint the third person. However,
the I.C.J. President must first consult with the President of the ICAO
Council. ICAO's arbitration role could not have been made smaller, but it
still exists.
The French government appointed Professor Paul Reuter, a French
national and Legal Consultant to the French Foreign Ministry. The United
States government appointed Professor Milton Katz, succeeded by Profes-
sor Henry P. de Vries, both law professors and United States citizens. Since
the party-appointed arbitrators could not agree on the selection of the third
member, the President of the International Court of Justice consulted with
ICAO Council's President and on March 26, 1963, appointed Italian Pro-
fessor Roberto Ago to the Tribunal. Insistence that the third arbitrator
not be a national of either of the parties is a common provision in recent
bilateral agreements, 7 necessary to achieve impartiality. If the President of
the International Court of Justice is of the nationality of one of the parties,
an alternative appointing authority should be stated in the bilateral. 8
D. Time Limits
Time limits within which the contracting parties must appoint arbi-
trators are necessary in order to avoid delay or complete frustration of
arbitration. The United States-France Agreement of 1946 provides that
each contracting party must choose its appointee to the arbitration tribunal
within two months after receipt of demand for arbitration from the other
party. The third arbitrator must be appointed within one additional
month (Article X). However, no time limits were provided for the ap-
pointment of the third arbitrator in the event the President of the I.C.J.
had to act. The demand for arbitration was presented to France on October
12; three months later, naming of the tribunal had not yet been com-
pleted. In fact, five months, and fourteen days expired before the third
arbitrator was finally named by the President of the International Court
of Justice, indicating the need for providing in the arbitration clause
against unnecessary delay when third members of the Tribunal cannot be
agreed upon by the party-appointed arbitrators.
Time limits for submission of the written pleadings to the Tribunal are
provided for in the Arbitration Agreement (Article III); the Tribunal
[1956, Part 1] 7 U.S.T. F4 O.I.A. 275, T.I.A.S. No. 3504; U.S.-Korea, Apr. 24, 1957, [1957,
Part 1] 8 U.S.T. Ef O.I.A. 549, T.I.A.S. No. 3807; U.S.-Iran, Apr. 17, 1958, [1958, Part 1]
9 U.S.T. &1 O.I.A. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 4021; Norway-Burma, (1953) 174 U.N.T.S. 49; The
E.C.A.C. Model Draft, 1959 Standard Clauses for Bilateral Agreements, Article 13. Also see Cooper,
op. cit. supra note 3; and Mankiewicz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 384.
a Greece v. United Kingdom, I.C.J. Rep. (1953) illustrates this point. Also see D.H.N. John-
son, op. cit. supra note 3, at 163-165.
'ECAC Model Draft, op. cit. supra note 35; U.S.-Japan, Sept. 15, 1953, [1953, Part 2] 4
U.S.T. r O.I.A. 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 2854; U.S.-Dcnmark, (as amended in 1954) op. cit. supra
note 35; U.S.-Germany, (1955) op. cit. supra note 35; U.S.-India, (1956) op. cit. supra note 35;
U.S.-Korea, (1957) op. cit. supra note 35; Norway-Burma, op. cit. supra note 35.
as United Kingdom-Yugoslavia, (1959) 359 U.N.T.S. 340, for example, provides such an
alternative.
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may extend them. The Tribunal is not required to state its opinion within
a time limit. However, the parties must file any requests for clarification of
the Tribunal's decision within four weeks after its rendition (Article VII).
Review of the arbitral award must be demanded within 6 months (Article
IX).
E. Place Of The Arbitration
The Tribunal, after consultation with the parties, was empowered to
fix the place where the arbitration would be held. Its location was not
mentioned in Article X of the 1946 Agreement. None of the bilateral air
transport agreements provide for the location of arbitration. By giving
the Tribunal the power to arrange the matter,"9 procrastination of a party
in agreeing to a location is avoided. The oral arguments before the Tribunal
took place in Geneva, Switzerland, September 20-28, 1963.
F. Procedure
No procedure for the Tribunal is found in the arbitration clause of the
1946 Agreement. The implication that the arbitrators themselves may
establish the procedural rules was removed by the explicit procedural
rules provided for in the Arbitration Agreement of 1963. It lays down
the number of permissible written pleadings (Article III). It requires the
Tribunal to write an opinion stating its reasoning and its conclusions. The
Tribunal decides by majority vote and if there is a dissenting opinion, it
must be included in the written Decision (Articles V and VI).
The same agreement incorporates a large part of the Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of October 18, 1907.0
It shall apply where the Arbitration Agreement of 1963 has not made
provisions: in case of death of an arbitrator (Article 59) ; it governs the
change of place of arbitration (Article 60 (3)), and certain extensions of
time limits. Conduct of the Arbitration, as well as regulation of review of
the Decision by the Tribunal are found in this convention, and made
applicable (Articles 64-84) to the extent that no conflict with the Arbi-
tration Agreement exists.
It is interesting to note that the parties have specially reserved the right
to review the arbitral award, upon discovery of new facts. The new in-
formation must be of a decisive character, in order to justify review by
the Tribunal. The demand for review must be made within six months
after the Decision has been pronounced (Article IX).
Within these limits, the Tribunal is permitted to establish its own pro-
cedure. 1 Dr. Domke has emphasized the need for procedural provisions
to guide arbitration tribunals dealing with air law problems."' The in-
clusion of arbitration procedure from the 1907 Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes thus must be considered as a major
advantage of the Arbitration Agreement of 1963.
The Arbitration Decision is final, like a judgment. It cannot be attacked
9Arbitration Agreement of 1963, op. cit. supra note 27, at Art. III and V.
"oConvention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of October 18, 1907, T.S.
536; 35 Stat. 2228; 2 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 43 (1908). This Convention was the product of the
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; in spite of failure to provide for compulsory arbitra-
tion of international disputes among parties to the Convention, it has had considerable impact as
a source of international arbitration rules.
", Arbitration Agreement of 1963, op. cit. supra note 27, at Art. VI.
42 M. Domke, op. cit. supra note 3, at 20.
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except as previously agreed upon by the parties." By providing both for
clarification and review in the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitral award
assumes even more of the character of a judgment, which can also be
clarified and be reviewed. Both are excellent provisions, tending to improve
the award. This requires that the Tribunal remain for a short time, as in
the United States-France arbitration, after it has pronounced the award,
rather than expire because its powers have terminated."
G. Expenses
Since the parties in private arbitration selected the tribunal themselves,
they also must pay all the expenses incurred by their tribunal. In the
private arbitration between the United States and France, it was agreed
that the parties themselves would pay the expenses of the arbitrators ap-
pointed by them. All other expenses were to be shared equally."
IV. IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION
Given the procedural machinery for dispute settlement, the Tribunal
began to consider the facts of the United States-France disagreement.
A. Interpretation Of "Near East"
The contractual meaning of "Near East" must be interpreted in the
light of the context of the bilateral agreement. In this the Tribunal agreed
with France. Since the term "Near East" does not have a meaning com-
monly agreed upon, it is particularly important to look to the context
for a definition. The case of The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland' on
which the United States relied, is not in point, because in that case the
word "Greenland" had a determined meaning; "Near East" has not. "Near
East" sometimes describes the entire area between Europe-Asia in the West,
and India in the East. At other times, "Near East" signifies only the coun-
tries which before World War I constituted the Arabian section of the
Ottoman Empire."
The Arbitration Tribunal agreed with France that the sequence in
which "Near East" appears in the Route description is important, because
the sequence indicates what the negotiators meant by the term. It appeared
to the Tribunal that the negotiators had in mind the area between Egypt
in the West and Pakistan-India in the East.48
In the Tribunal's opinion, "Near East" would correspond to a vast air
corridor between Egypt and Pakistan-India. It describes a very general,
rather than a particular, path of a route. Being general, great flexibility in
changing points within that path is permitted."
The omission of points provision, which precedes the Route One de-
scription, was considered to be of no interpretive importance. Reading it
narrowly, the Tribunal thought that it does not indicate anything beyond
its factual permission.
"' See the provisions for clarification in Art. VII and the provisions for review in Art. IV of
the 1963 Arbitration Agreement, op. cit. supra note 27.
"Simpson and Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 264.
4' Arbitration Agreement of 1963, op. cit. supra note 27, at Art. VIII.
"' The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland; publications of the P.C. I.J. series A/B, No. 53, p. 52
(1933).
" Decision of the Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71-74.
48 Id. at 77-79.
49 Ibid.
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The Tribunal concluded that Turkey and Iran were not included in
the 1946 description of Route One because a route through Turkey to
India is found in Route Two. The parties had not provided for a merger
of Route One with Route Two."0 Therefore, Istanbul, Ankara and Tehran
were not intended to be part of Route One.
B. Consideration Of The Negotiations Preceding The 1946 Agreement
The legislative history of the 1946 Agreement was particularly import-
ant to the Tribunal. There tends to be agreement with the French argu-
ment about the CAB Route Decision, 5 which, the Tribunal finds, was
communicated to France for the purpose of making the draft agreement
conform with the CAB Decision. On the map, the CAB's Southern
Route was confined to South of (below) a line drawn South of Cyprus,
through Jerusalem, through Basra, ending halfway between Karachi and
Bombay. A definite impression of what the United States wanted was
thereby conveyed to the French government."
The United States also transmitted the Bermuda Agreement 5" to France
during the negotiations stage of the 1946 Agreement. It requested the
French government to consider the Bermuda Agreement a basis for nego-
tiation by asking France to indicate which parts of the Bermuda Agreement
it wished to include in their new air transport agreement. The Tribunal
agreed with France that its negotiators were further induced by the de-
scription of Route Three in the Bermuda Agreement to think that the
United States wanted a route corresponding to the CAB's Southern
Route. 4
By having Egypt inserted just before the words "Near East" in Ameri-
can Route One of the 1946 Agreement, the United States yet further
confirmed in the French negotiators' minds that United States wanted
intermediate points on a line from Egypt to India, i.e., in conformity with
the CAB's Southern Route. The French negotiators were consequently
justified in assuming that Route One of the 1946 Agreement would coin-
cide with the CAB's Southern Route. As the Tribunal sees it, therefore,
Istanbul, Ankara and Tehran were not intended by the parties to be in-
cluded within Route One under the description of "Near East."'5
C. Interpretation Of "Route Changes"
Only "changes in the routes" are permitted by Section VII. The Tribunal
states that this means changes within the general path of a route. Section
" Id. at 80-82. However, several routes in Schedule II of the Annex to the 1946 Agreement
overlap. For instance, Route Two overlaps Route Eight and Route Three overlaps Route One, in
their final stages.
"North Atlantic Route Case, CAB Docket No. 855 (1945).
"Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87-89.
"United States-United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1499, 3 U.N.T.S. 243 (1946).
"4 Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87-89.
" Id. at 93. In spite of French permission to U.S.A. to grant several U.S. carriers the right to
compete on routes (Annex to the 1946 Agreement, Sec. II) it appears that France, putting so much
meaning into The CAB Route Decision, expected that only one U.S. carrier would serve each
route. France, itself, intended a system of "chosen" carriers. Contrary to possible French expecta-
tion, the United States in 1950 permitted two carriers to serve Route One. Since Route One through
the "Near East" is flexible, France should have anticipated that a second carrier (PAA) would
schedule different stops on Route One than those utilized by the established carrier (TWA). If
this was indeed a French dilemma, it should have carried some weight with the Tribunal and
placed considerations of the CAB Route Decision and the Bermuda Agreement in the right
perspective.
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VII cannot be used to add Istanbul, Ankara and Tehran to Route One be-
cause they are outside of the general path of that Route" as defined by a
1959 agreement. 7
It should be remembered, however, that the French and English versions
of the 1946 Agreement are equally authoritive (Article VII). The French
version of Section VII uses the expression Toutes modification des lignes
aeriennes, where the American version says "Changes made by either
Contracting Party in the routes." The French word modification implies
a smaller alteration than the word "change." It is apparent that the French
government relied on the narrower French version by arguing that only
minor changes in the route are allowed. The Tribunal follows the French
interpretation of Article VII, and even in the English version of its De-
cision, uses the word "modifications" instead of "changes."
Had Route One been described precisely, point-by-point instead of in
general regional terms, Section VII would not have been so important: it
could not have been used to add countries.
D. Consideration Of Subsequent Practice
The practice of the parties in interpreting the 1946 Agreement supported
the Tribunal's conclusion that Istanbul, Ankara and Tehran were not
added to Route One and that these points are not now within the term
"Near East" as used in the 1946 Agreement. France never agreed to the
American interpretation which would include the three cities within
Route One. Neither did France ever consent to a change in Route One
under Section VII. However, the French failure to continually refuse to
recognize PAA's right to serve Beirut and Tehran was considered crucial
by the Tribunal. By failing after 1951 to continue active protest to PAA's
right to serve Beirut, France consented to the legality of this service.
Similarly, French failure to object to PAA service to Damascus in 1952,
1953 and 1955 and its failure to object in 1959 to the addition of Bagdad
to the Ankara flight constitutes consent to these services via Paris. As long
as PAA observed the condition of the French consent, it was allowed to
continue to serve these points."
The Tribunal concluded the service to Tehran via Beirut and Damascus
was not within Route One." Therefore, this service was not authorized by
the 1946 Agreement. However, independently of that Agreement, France
in 1955 gave PAA permission to perform this flight to Tehran via Paris
subject to flight limitations. The French permit of 1955 was followed by
uninterrupted PAA service on the route without French objection. When
granted, PAA's service was called "temporary," but in view of the long
service and the known responsibility involved in giving the initial per-
mission, the Tribunal considered PAA's permit a permanent one. By call-
ing the permit a temporary one, France only accomplished that the Tehran
service should not be based on authority arising out of the 1946 Agree-
5' Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 27, at 95-98.
57Minutes of Negotiations of July 20-August 5, 1959, quoted in the Decision of the Arbitra-
tion Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 42-44. Also see Art. XIII of the 1946 Agreement, which
states that major changes must have the consent of both parties.
"1 Decision of the Tribunal, op. cit. supra note I, at 108-109.
. PAA operated a free shuttle service from Beirut to Damascus from 1951; see Airways Guide,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 314. Later it substituted Damascus for Beirut on two weekly flights to
Tehran.
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ment. Instead, the service to Tehran was founded on a right independent
of the 1946 Agreement, i.e., the 1955 permission followed by prolonged
use." The interruption by France of commercial traffic on the route to
Tehran in 1962 is of no consequence. France at this time knew that it
could not deprive the United States carriers of these rights.
The Tribunal found no French consent to regard Turkey as being with-
in Route One. Only by virtue of the exchange of notes between the parties
in 1960, did the United States obtain authority to serve Istanbul via Paris
without commercial traffic rights."
V. THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
Can a United States carrier serve Turkey via Paris? Yes: Not by virtue
of the 1946 Agreement, since Turkey is not within "Near East," in Route
One; but as a consequence of French permission of 1955 to serve Istanbul,
confirmed by the 1960 exchange of notes.
Does a United States Airline have commercial traffic rights between
Paris and Turkey? No: Neither does the 1946 Agreement authorize the
service to Turkey, nor does the subsequent permission to serve Turkey
include commercial traffic rights.
Does a United States carrier have the right to serve Iran via Paris? Yes:
Not by virtue of the 1946 Agreement, but because of the French consent,
commencing in 1955, to the service Paris-Rome-Tehran, and subsequent
practice.
Does a United States airline have commercial traffic rights between the
United States and Tehran via Paris? Yes: Not by virtue of the 1946 Agree-
ment, but by French consent to vesting of these rights in a United States
airline, and subsequent use of the rights. The interruption of commercial
traffic rights in 1962 was of no fundamental importance because of the
immediate prospect of arbitration.
VI. THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
Logically, an award must determine the obligations of both parties, it
must settle the dispute without leaving issues open and the Tribunal's
language must be so clear that a similar, objective interpretation by both
parties results.
By virtue of the letters during December 8, 1962-January 9, 1963, the
award as pronounced was made binding on the parties.
In addition to the questions submitted by the parties, the Tribunal ex-
pressed its opinion on contingent matters such as the French consent to
the Beirut service. This raises the problem of whether the Tribunal kept
within its competence, because lack of jurisdiction and exceeding of com-
petence by a Tribunal renders its decision void."2 In other words, are the
parties bound by the Tribunal's opinion on the Beirut-Damascus service?
The parties permitted the Tribunal to determine its jurisdiction on a liberal
00 Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 109-113.
Il1d. at 114-117.
62 The International Law Commission Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure of 1958 provides
for annulment of an award when the arbitration tribunal exceeds its delegated powers. See Report
of the International Law Commission covering the work of its Tenth Session, April 28-July 4, 1958;
United Nations General Assembly Official Records. Thirteenth Session Supplement No. 9 (A/3859)
at Art. XXV. See also Cheng, General Principles of Law, op. cit. supra note 3, at 261.
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interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement. "3 Although the two questions
posed to the Tribunal do not directly mention Beirut and Damascus, the
issues of traffic rights to these two cities are so closely related to the ques-
tion of the service to Tehran, that the Tribunal under its broad powers of
jurisdiction could consider traffic rights at these two points. The opinion
rendered on service to Tehran is based on French consent to PAA serving
Beirut and Damascus, and the Tribunal's discussion of that service was part
of a logical thought progression. Thus, it would be logical for France
and the United States to consider themselves bound by that opinion. The
law of International Arbitration permits the Tribunal to decide ancillary
claims which cannot be separated from the dispute." The traffic rights to
Beirut and Damascus are so closely related to the question of the service
to Tehran that the parties are legally bound by the Tribunal's opinion
on this question.
France and the United States disagree in their interpretation of the
award, and have decided to ask for clarification pursuant to Article VII of
the 1963 Arbitration Agreement. The Tribunal neglected to mention
whether there is a limitation in frequency of service to Tehran via both
Turkey and Beirut. This issue is not one of the formal questions to the
Tribunal which were concisely answered. However, it illustrates what
promises to be a major problem in forthcoming air transport arbitrations:
language so clear, and phrasing so complete, that minor points will not
destroy the usefulness of the Decision."5
The arbitral award goes into effect immediately, unless otherwise pro-
vided for by the Tribunal or the parties. The Tribunal did not postpone
the effectiveness of the award, neither did the parties by any of the agree-
ments leading up to the arbitration agree to a postponement. Therefore,
the award became binding as soon as pronounced at the public sitting of
the Tribunal.6
Confusion about interpretation of the Tribunal's Decision (Article VII)
and discovery of new facts (Article IX) may cause excusable delay in
making the award effective, although time limits are provided.
Failure of a party to obey an arbitral award would bring enforcement
into issue. It is a violation of international law if a country fails to observe
an arbitral award which is binding.
As a retaliation, in case of non-compliance with the award, the party
which seeks to enforce it can abrogate the agreement, in this case the 1946
Agreement, under which the Arbitration arose. The United Kingdom
seriously threatened to deny United States carriers landing rights for
failure to comply with the rates agreed upon at the IATA "Chandler"
63 Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6. Also see Cheng, General
Principles of Law, op. cit. supra note 3, at 276-277 stating that the Arbitration Tribunal may
determine the extent of its jurisdiction.
"4Simpson and Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 176, 179.
' The arbitration is now closed. The points of clarification which France demanded under
Article VII have been decided: (1) a United States air carrier has the right to serve Tehran, via
Damascus, with full traffic rights, only on the route Rome-Beirut-Damascus, with the right to
omit any of the points; (2) the United States carrier is only allowed four flights a week; (3) the
United States carrier is not allowed commercial rights when serving Tehran via Paris on the route
Rome-Istanbul-Ankara. The Tribunal has thus solved the most interesting procedural problem in
the arbitration.66 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, op. cit. supra note 40, at Art. 80.
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Conference." Denial of landing rights is therefore a real possibility as a
method of enforcement of an arbitration award. The Arbitration Tribunal,
itself, has no power of enforcement at its disposal, however." A delinquent
state cannot be legally forced to obey an award. Nothing has been able
to force Albania to pay damages to United Kingdom incurred in the
Corfu Channel Case." Neither did Columbia cease to give asylum to
Haya de la Torre as required by the International Court of Justice."0 Both
cases illustrate how weak is the position of the winning party to an inter-
national dispute.
VII. LESSONS OF THE UNITED STATES-FRANCE ARBITRATION
A. Viability Of Private Arbitration For The Settlement Of Air Transport
Disputes
States prefer to settle disputes by negotiations; they do not want to go
to trial before the International Court of Justice, as shown by the few
cases which are there presented. Arbitration is the middle road.
There are several reasons why parties might prefer arbitration over a
court trial. Arbitration is often a quicker method of solving a dispute,
although some arbitrations have been known to take more time than court
cases.7 It is less formal than a court trial. The parties to private tripartite
arbitration have more to say about who will serve on the arbitration tri-
bunal than they would about the composition of a court, because the
parties directly assist in choosing the tribunal. They can thus seek suit-
able arbitrators for their air transport arbitration. An arbitration is usually
a less expensive mode of dispute settlement than a court trial; but it may
be noted that the parties carry the expenses of the Arbitration Tribunal
directly. The parties to air transport agreements frequently have com-
pulsory arbitration clauses.
Sometimes institutionalized arbitration by ICAO is used," but now more
frequently, provision is made for private arbitration. Significantly, pri-
vate arbitration was permitted to function in the United States-France
Arbitration. Dr. Leo Gross expresses:
The more arbitration becomes generalized and institutionalized, the more
sweeping, if less explicit, become the reservations of which the Connally
Reservation has rightly come to be regarded as a symbol."
Dr. Gross concludes that institutionalized arbitration is frequently found
in agreements, but is rarely used, because the parties do not wish to sub-
mit to compulsory institutionalized arbitration.
The private arbitration provided for in the United States-France bi-
lateral air transport agreement was acceptable to the parties. They did
not mind submitting to a tribunal chosen by themselves. The simplicity
of the proceedings is appealing: it comes closer to negotiation between
67 Aviation Weekly 36 (June 3, 1963).
6 See Simpson and Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 264.
69Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Rep. (1949).
70 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266.
71 Johnson, op. cit. supra note 3, at 175.
71 Institutional arbitration is arbitration by an association to which both parties belong. In
private arbitration the parties select an arbitration tribunal agreeable to both.
71 Gross, Some Observations on the International Court of Justice, 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 39 (1962).
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parties than does the formalized institutional arbitration. The arbitration
proves that persons suitable to serve as arbitrators exist, and that countries
need not avoid arbitration for lack of qualified arbitrators.
It may seem strange that there was no dissenting opinion, particularly
since the issues were so controversial and all the arguments, except con-
sent and usage, favor France's position. It is to be expected that the two
party-appointed arbitrators will disagree74 although it would be a mistake
to consider a nationally appointed arbitrator as an attorney for his country.
He is entirely independent.7" The resolute and unanimous decision, however,
indicates that the arbitrators worked among themselves to convince each
other, and the results cast credit on the use of arbitration in bilateral air
transport agreements.
B. Changing United States Attitude Toward Arbitration
There has been an increase in the general use of arbitration over the
last thirty years." The United States-France Arbitration may indicate that
bilateral air transport agreements may be part of that trend. The arbitra-
tion clauses in the agreements have greatly improved and they are be-
ginning to see use.
The United States had a backlog of unsolved air transport disputes with
foreign countries during the nineteen fifties. Particularly toward the end
of that period there was no American progress in policy making. Disagree-
ments under the bilaterals were increasing, and negotiations did not solve
the disputes.77 The Kennedy Administration took a hard look at situations
irritating to foreign partners in air agreements. A policy change ensued.
In April, 1963, a presidential policy statement indicated that arbitration
would be one of the methods to be used to settle disputes arising under
the bilateral agreements." The decision in 1962 to solve the dispute with
France by arbitration must be seen as a by-product of the new American
policy.
A joint communique issued by the United States and Italy, released on
March 23, 1964, further evidences the policy change. On United States
proposal, Italy agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether all-cargo services
are within or outside of the bilateral air transport agreement between the
two countries."
The decision to use arbitration is significant. There is a great difference
between having agreed to settle future disputes by arbitration, on the one
hand, and actually using this device. The parties may be satisfied with
stalemated negotiations, or they may denounce agreements when a stalemate
occurs. It requires a definite act by a party to demand arbitration. That is
why one may speak about countries' willingness to arbitrate, although
compulsory arbitration is agreed upon. A familiar lament about the arbi-
tration clauses is that they have not been used in spite of the existence of
suitable disputes.
7 Simpson and Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40.
75 For explication of this theme, see Cheng, General Principles of Law, op. cit. supra note 3, at
283.76 Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 Am. J. Comp. L., 283 (1958).
" Johnson, The International Aviation Policy of the United States, 49 Dep't State Bull. 507
(1963).
7Pres. J. F. Kennedy, Statement on International Air Transport Policy 10, released April 24,
1963.
79 Vol. L, No. 1295, Dep't State Bull., 628 (April 20, 1964).
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The interest in the United States for arbitration is not limited to United
States air rights disputes abroad. Spokesmen for the State Department have
let it be known that the United States is equally willing to arbitrate dis-
putes relating to the air rights of foreign countries in the United States.
C. Role Of Airlines In International Aviation Law And Diplomacy
PAA initiated the dispute with France. It interpreted the term "Near
East" to include both Turkey and Iran. After it had made the interpre-
tation, it called upon the United States government, a party to the bi-
lateral with France, to defend it.
It is really the existence of the airlines which is at stake. Airlines are
delegated the privileges which a contracting state obtains under a bilateral
air transport agreement. They have a tendency to consider air rights as
their property and believe that their government acts on their behalf in
obtaining traffic rights. In fact, it is the United States Government's duty
to promote the welfare of United States carriers."0 PAA, and other inter-
national air carriers, use the United States government whenever possible,
to obtain foreign traffic rights. On the other side, Air France, which is an
arm of the French government, seeks to limit PAA's expansion and com-
petition. Consequently, the airlines are the real parties in the arbitration
between the United States and France. They both furnish arguments for
their states and are, indeed, the subjects of arbitration.
Because of the airlines' strong private interest, the proceedings assume
the character of a commercial arbitration between two airlines. The com-
petitiveness with which arguments are brought forth in the United States-
France Arbitration indicates how the airlines bring pressure to bear on
their governments to further their cause.
The United States-France Arbitration is a now common instance of
airline "diplomacy." A recent case has been the international fares dispute.
Although United States international carriers are privately owned, and
although IATA is a non-governmental body of the world's airlines which
fixes international rates, the CAB directly interfered on behalf of United
States international carriers during the 1963 "Chandler" crisis, in order
to prevent an increase in fares. The CAB ordered United States carriers
to maintain fares lower that the IATA Conference fares, and it entered
into direct negotiations with other governments on this point."
PAA's push for new traffic rights into Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Tehran,
Istanbul and Ankara was lucrative for the airline; it did not improve
French relations with the United States. On a de facto basis, the arbitration
favored PAA.
Although PAA is not a government controlled enterprise, as is Air
8"Federal Aviation Act of August 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 731, § 102.
" The CAB sent observers to the subsequent IATA conference at Salzburg, which was of
course pressure through presence in support of the American stand for lower fares. Shortly after-
wards, the CAB chairman led a U.S. government delegation visit to several European countries
to obtain lower international fares for U.S. carriers. Again, the government teams negotiated
directly with other governments much to the unhappy surprise of foreign airlines, although gov-
ernment interference is more familiar to them. See "Pan Am, BOAC Reach Fare Compromise,"
Aviation Weekly, Dec. 9, 1963. The U.S. international carriers bless and promote efforts on their
behalf.
Not only have the U.S. international carriers influenced foreign relations, but they caused dis-
sension in the U.S. Government between the CAB and State Department, which resulted in
greater responsibility being given to the State Department to conduct U.S. air transport relations
with foreign countries. See Johnson, op. cil. supra note 77, at 507.
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France, it is clear that as a private company, dedicated to profit as well
as service, it can interpret agreements and involve the government to a
surprising degree. Within the American system, it is difficult to determine
the point as which private interests cease, and government interests begin.
In the words of President Kennedy's Policy Statement,
Entrepreneurs of daring and vision launched our air transport industry. We
believe that the system should continue to benefit from that irreplaceable
stimulus to growth brought by competitive enterprise."
82 Pres. Kennedy's Policy Statement, op. cit. supra note 78, at 2.
